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Significant Fishery Management Issues
in the Law of the Sea Conference:
Illusions and Realities
FARIN MIRVAHABI*
The author discusses several significant fishery issues left unset-
tled by the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Atten-
tion is also focused on some fishery provisions of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text which may be incorporated into thefinal treaty. Finally, the fishery problems encountered in the pres-
ence or absence of a treaty are explored. Ms. Mirvahabi notes that the
absence of a treaty may result in the use of the doctrine of laissez-
faire/laissez-passer creating a chaotic situation. On the other hand,
the presence of a treaty although not immediately resolving law of
the sea issues, will nevertheless act as a foundation for further sea-
related determinations by ocean users.
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INTRODUCTION
Like previous sessions, the Sixth Session of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was held
in New York City from 23 May to 15 July 1977, failed to produce a
final comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea. This failure has
raised the issue whether the Conference is capable of producing any
treaty in the near future.
The purpose of this Article is to examine some of the significant
fishery issues. Nevertheless, at the outset, it is appropriate to briefly
discuss the Conference itself.'
M-ny observers believe that the success or failure of this Confer-
ence will not have any impact on the world public order. It is true
1. On the background and preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference,
see A STAFF REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SEABED CoMM., THE OUTER CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF AND MARINE MINERAL DEVELOPMENT, SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., IST SESS., THE LAW OF THE SEA CRISIS, pt. 1
(Comm. Print 1972); id., pt. 2, at 5-16 (Comm. Print 1972); CoMM. TO STUDY THE
ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, 23D REPORT, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OCEANS,
CURRENT ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (Jun. 1973); COMM. TO STUDY THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF PEACE, 21ST REPORT, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA (II)
(June 1970); COMM. TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, 19TH REPORT, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA (Mar. 1969); Law of the Sea: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); W. BURKE, SoME THOUGHTS ON FISHERIES
AND A NEw CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (Law of the Sea Inst., U. of R.I.,
Occasional Paper No. 9, 1971); Knight, Issues Before the Third United Nations
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that the success of UNCLOS will not resolve the existing problems in
the Middle East, Rhodesia, or South Africa, but it will definitely
reduce some of the political pressures in intergovernmental relations.
For example, the executive branch of the United States Government
pleaded with Congress for several years to prevent the enactment of a
200-mile fishing zone, as this would harm the United States' rela-
tions with Japan, the Soviet Union, and other distant-water fishing
nations which were fishing in waters adjacent to the coastal areas of
the United States.2 Nevertheless, the United States Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act of 19763 was passed by Congress, but
only after the majority of the delegates in UNCLOS had agreed on a
200-mile exclusive fishing zone. The political pressure was further
reduced when some other coastal States extended their fishing zones
to 200 miles through similar legislation.
In emphasizing the significance of UNCLOS, one may say the mere
fact that it exists makes it important. But a more sophisticated
argument includes the following: (i) There are 150 participating
States (some non-United Nations members), including all the newly
independent States which did not participate in the 1958 Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea; (ii) there are twenty-five topics
and sixty sub-topics for discussion; and (iii) the negotiations in this
Conference are related to other problems of the world community,
such as food, population, environment, energy, resource management
and transfer of technology.
Unlike the 1930 Hague Conference and the 1958 Geneva Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, which were designated for codification of
the pre-established rules and customs of international law, the pre-
sent Law of the Sea Conference has developed new concepts, such as
the common heritage of mankind, exclusive economic zones, transit
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 34 LA. L. REV. 155 (1974); Knight, The Draft
United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area: Background
Description and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 459, 477-86
(1971); Pardo, Development of Ocean Space-An International Dilemma, 31 LA.
L. REV. 45 (1970); Sohn, A Tribunal for the Sea, Bed or the Oceans, 32
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLRNDISCHES OFFENTLIcHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 253
(1972); Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparation for the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1974).
2. See Fisheries Jurisdictions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1975) (statement of John N.
Moore).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976).
passage, and the rights of landlocked States. Furthermore, the
Conference is trying to achieve a new international legal order as
well as a new international economic order.
It should be noted here that the success of UNCLOS in concluding
a comprehensive universal treaty will not resolve the law of the sea
problems immediately, for the problems of ratification, reservation
and interpretation always begin following the drafting of treaties. On
the other hand, in the absence of a treaty, and based on the doctrine
of laissez-faire/laissez-passer, the users of the ocean may create
chaotic situations.
Based on the foregoing general discussion, this Article will now
turn to fisheries. Fishery negotiations are almost exhausted in
Committee HI of UNCLOS, and the fishery part of the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)4 is almost agreed upon. There-
fore, this Article will examine some of the significant fishery provi-
sions of the ICNT which may be incorporated into the final treaty
and the fishery problems inherent in the presence or absence of a
treaty.
THE 200-MIILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Evolution of the Concept
The claims and practices of the Latin American nations concerning
their adjacent seas, inspired by the Truman Proclamation,' are con-
sidered the original bases for formulation of the new economic zone
doctrine.6 The Santiago Declaration of 1952 was the first multilateral
4. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/WP. 10
(1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT], is the outcome of the Sixth Session of
UNCLOS.
5. Pres. Proc. No. 2667,3 C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.
485 (1945).
6. For discussions and analyses of the economic zone, see F. GARCIA
AmADOR, LATIN AMERICA AND THE LAw OF THE SEA (Law of the Sea Inst., U. of
R.I., Occasional Paper No. 14,1972); D. JOHNSON & E. GOLD, THE EcONOIC ZONE
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS
(Law of the Sea Inst., U. of R.I., Occasional Paper No. 17, 1973); Ad Hoc Comm.
on the Law of the Sea, International Section of the ABA, Information Report on
the Law of the Sea: Understanding the Debate on the Ocean Space, 8 INT'L LAW.
688 (1974); Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEEDS AND
INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 161 (L. Alexander ed. 1973); Alexander,
The Extended Economic Zone and United States Ocean Interest, 10 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 35 (1975); Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile
Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569 (1975); Hollick,
The Origins of the 200-Mile Offshore Zones, Notes and Comments, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 494 (1977); Katz, Consequences of the Economic Zone Catch Opportuni-
ties of Fishing Nations, 2 MAR. STUDY MANAGEMENT 144 (1975); Osieke, The
Contribution of States from the Third World to the Development of the Law of
the Continental Shelf and the Concept of Economic Zone, 15 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
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agreement which established maritime zones of 200 miles for Chile,
Ecuador and Peru.7 The Latin Americans find the origin of their
claims in a natural law philosophy that would justify the special
interests of coastal States in the so-called "patrimonial sea." Pat-
rimonial is not synonymous with territorial, but it is coterminous
with an inherent right of the coastal State based on geographical
continuity and pre-existent international claims. 8 This doctrine was
reflected in the Lima Conference of 1954,9 the Meeting of the Inter-
American Council of Jurists of 195 6,10 the Declaration of Montevideo
of 1970,11 the Declaration of Lima of 1970,12 and the Declaration of
Santo Domingo of 1972.13
During the 1950's and the 1960's, claims to a 200-mile maritime
zone also received support from newly independent States which
were ready to challenge any rules of international law laid down by
colonial powers in the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea. In its resolution of 1971, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) established a national economic zone of 212 miles from the
baseline, in the oceans and seas surrounding Africa.14 The Meeting of
Yaounde, coupled with the meetings sponsored by the African-Asian
Legal Consultative Committee in 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974,15
strengthened the formulation of the exclusive economic zone in the
third UNCLOS. 16
Law of the Sea Conference and the Economic Zone
More than 100 participants in the Caracas Session of UNCLOS,
either through written or oral statements, supported the adoption of
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. However, there was a debate
311 (1975); Pollard, The Exclusive Economic Zone-The Elusive Consensus, 12
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 600 (1975); Qu~nedec, La Zone Economique, 79 REV. GEN.
DROIT INT'L PUB. 321 (Avril-Juin 1975).
7. F. GARCIA AMvADOR, LATIN AMERICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Law of the
Sea Inst., U. of R.I., Occasional Paper No. 14, 1972).
8. See D. JOHNSON & E. GOLD, supra note 6, at 2.
9. See PAN AMERICAN UNION, RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRD MEET-
ING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS 30 (provisional edition 1956).
10. See D. JOHNSON & E. GOLD, supra note 6, at 3-4.
11. U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 138/34 (1970).
12. U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 138/28 (1970).
13. U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 138/80 (1972).
14. U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/C. 2/L. 82 (1974).
15. See D. JOHNSON & E. GOLD, supra note 6, at 6-7; Njenga, Africa, in
PERSPECTIVES ON OCEAN POLICY 87,94-95 (Ocean Pol'y Project, John Hopkins U.,
1974).
16. The Latin American and African claims although sharing the same
concerning the rights and duties of the coastal State within the zone.
The debate continued in the Geneva Session of 1975 in the same
manner as it had in Caracas.17 Finally, the negotiations in Committee
11 resulted in Article 45 of the Single Negotiating Text (SNT),18 which
describes the rights and duties of the coastal State within the zone.
The zone, however, seems to be territorial with respect to the exclu-
sive sovereign rights of the coastal State over the resources and
international with respect to other uses, such as freedom of naviga-
tion and overflight. This dual characteristic of the zone raises the
question whether the zone should have the judicial status of the high
seas. On the one hand, the SNT establishes strong sovereign rights for
the coastal State concerning the living and nonliving resources with-
in its zone. On the other hand, it enumerates some of the high-seas
freedoms. 19 To complicate the matter even further, Article 73 of the
SNT defines the high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone . . . in the territorial sea
.... )20 The same formula is adopted by the Revised Single
Negotiating Text (RSNT)2' and the ICNT.22 Some commentators have
noted that "the zone is neither territorial, nor high seas, but sui
generis.'
' 23
characteristics, have different approaches. Njenga, Africa, in PERSPECTIVES ON
OCEAN POLICY 87, 96-97 (Ocean Pol'y Project, John Hopkins U., 1974).
17. For details on the Caracas (1974) and Geneva (1975) sessions of the
Conference, see LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND (F. Christy, T. Clingan,
J. Gamble, H. Knight & E. Miles eds. 1975); Hollick, Commentary to PERSPEc-
TIvEs ON OCEAN POLICY 21 (Ocean Pol'y Project, John Hopkins U., 1974); Steven-
son, The Caracas Session in Review: Remarks on the Second Session of the
Third Law of the Sea Conference, in PERSPECTIVES ON OCEAN POLICY (Ocean
Pol'y Project, John Hopkins U., 1974); Amerasinghe, Basic Principles Relating
to the International Regime of the Oceans at the Caracas Session of the U.N.
Law of the Sea Conference, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 213 (1975); Balpuri, The Soviet
Views on the Law of the Sea at the Caracas Session, 15 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 383-89
(1975). See also Caminos, The Law of the Sea at the Caracas Session: A Brief
Evaluation, 14 COLtuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 80 (1975); Gardner, Post Caracas: Strik-
ing a Bargain for Settlement at Geneva, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3 (1975),
Henkin, A Close Look at Some Issues for Geneva-Ocean Policy, Marine Envi-
ronment and Fisheries, 14 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 56 (1975); Hollick, LOS III:
Prospects and Problems, 14 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 92 (1975); Oxman & West,
Issues to be Resolved in the Second Substantive Session on the Law of the Sea,
14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 87 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 763 (1975).
18. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/pt. 2 (1975). Article 45 of the Single Negotiating
Text has become Article 60 of the ICNT.
19. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/pt. 2, arts. 45 & 46.
20. Id., art. 73. See also ICNT, supra note 4, art. 86.
21. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8 Rev. 1/pt. 2, arts. 44-46, 75 (1976).
22. See note 4 supra.
23. Stevenson &'Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 763, 778 (1975).
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The foregoing discussion reflects some of the exclusive economic
zone problems and proposals that were negotiated by UNCLOS, but
it does not include the issues that were not raised. One of these
missing proposals could have suggested a narrower zone for fishing
purposes. Scientific research has proven that the most abundant
fishing areas of the ocean are found within the first eighty miles of
the coastal States. Therefore, the question remains: why the 200-mile
fishing zone?
In favor of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone one may argue
that the zone was established conveniently for the exploitation of
both living and nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil and the
superjacent waters of the coastal State. Second, the majority of
States are coastal and therefore can benefit from such zones. Third,
the zone usually includes the continental shelf of the coastal State.
Finally, such a zone is useful in fencing out foreign fishing vessels.
There are, however, counterarguments to the 200-mile exclusive
fishery zone. First, the zone may be to the advantage of a coastal
State with mineral resources because there is a limited number of
States with the know-how and technology of seabed mining; there-
fore, the coastal State will not face congestion problems in the zone,
whereas for a fishing coastal State, congestion of fishing vessels is an
inevitable problem. Next, the license-fee formula may attract more
newcomers to the area. Furthermore, the existence of the zone will
not discourage the distant-water fishing nations which have tradi-
tionally fished in the area. In addition, the 200-mile zone does not
cover the highly migratory fish species that swim over thousands of
miles. The cost of enforcement of fisheries jurisdiction is another
item for consideration. Finally, the economic gain from an eighty-
mile abundant fishing zone may be more desirable than the political
and ideological gains from a 200-mile fishing zone.
Treaty Approach
The status of the exclusive economic zone upon the conclusion of a
universal treaty (assuming that the treaty will incorporate INCT) will
be sui generis, as noted before. In other words, the coastal State will
have exclusive jurisdiction over most of the activities in the zone, but
the international community can also enjoy certain limited rights.
It is interesting to note that the concept of sovereignty in the
present UNCLOS negotiations is not treated as it was in the
nineteenth century. Part V of the INCT,24 which deals with exclusive
economic zone topics, refers to "sovereign rights," 25 "exclusive
rights," 26 "exclusive jurisdiction, '27 and "jurisdiction. '28 These ref-
erences may be interpreted to mean that the right of the coastal State
within its economic zone is not as complete as sovereignty. Moreover,
there are always certain duties attached to the rights of the coastal
State, and this is a theme which can be seen throughout the ICNT.
It is not difficult to predict that all coastal States will most likely
extend their fishing zones to 200 miles upon the conclusion of a law
of the sea treaty. But the interesting issue is whether these States
which have in the past treated such zones as territorial seas will sign
the treaty. A coastal State with a 200-mile territorial sea 20 may either
sign the treaty with certain reservations or may ratify it and change
its national legislation concerning the territorial sea. There is also the
possibility that such a State will not sign the treaty at all. In that
case, the present State practice with respect to such claims may
continue.30
Non-Treaty Approach
In the absence of a universal law of the sea treaty, one can easily
predict that most coastal States will probably extend their fishing
zones to 200 miles.3' But the crucial point here is whether the
continuation of such State practice after a considerable period of
time constitutes customary international law. For several centuries,
and prior to the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea,
customary international law played a significant role in governing
24. ICNT, supra note 4, pt. V.
25. Article 56 refers to the coastal State's sovereign rights "for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent
waters." Id., art. 56(1)(a).
26. Id., art. 60(1).
27. Id., art. 60(2).
28. Id., art. 56(1)(b).
29. The list at the Office of the Geographer, United States Department of
State, indicates that the following nine States are presently claiming a 200-mile
territorial sea: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Liberia, Panama, Peru,
Sierra Leone, and Somalia. At the Geneva Session of UNCLOS, in 1975, despite
the favoritism towards the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, Ecuador was still
seeking support for its 200-mile territorial sea proposal. See U.N. Doc. AIConf.
62/C. 2/L. 88 (1975).
30. See text accompanying notes 43-54 infra.
31. At the present time the list available at the Office of the Geographer,
United States Department of State, indicates that the following 27 States have
claimed 200-mile fishing zones: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, Chile,
Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Guatemala, Iceland, India, Ireland, Maldives, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the Soviet Union.
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maritime relations among States. Therefore, creation of new custom-
ary laws as a result of the failure of UNCLOS is not unusual.
Nevertheless, repetition of the State practice with respect to 200-
mile fishing zones cannot establish customary international law un-
less and until such practice has been acquiesced to by other States.3 2
In its unilateral claim, the coastal State may establish exclusive or
preferential rights. Exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State can be
interpreted as exclusion of foreign fishermen, whereas, in the case of
preferential rights based on some agreements, the coastal State usu-
ally allows foreign fishermen to operate in its fishing zone.
"Exclusive" and "preferential" rights were discussed at the 1958
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. But the Conference, by
adopting the "special situation" resolution, 3 recognized the prefe-
rential rights of a coastal State which was economically dependent
upon the fishery resources of the adjacent waters.34
In the absence of a law of the sea treaty, access to the fishery
resources within the 200-mile zone can only be obtained through
bilateral agreements between the coastal State and the fishing nation
involved.35 The same alternative is available for the "historic
32. For a discussion on customary law, see Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 132, 138-39,191. For details on custom-
ary international law, see E. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATION-
AL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 368 (1958); M. McDOUGAL & P. FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINiuM PUBLIC ORDER--THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION 361 (1961); Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47
Am. J. INT'L L. 662 (1953); McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the Inter-
national Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955); Wright, Custom as a Basis
for International Law in the Post-War World, 2 TEX. INT'L L.F. 147 (1966).
33. Resolution on Special Situations Relating to Coastal Fisheries, U.N. Doc.
AIConf. 131L. 56 (1958).
34. The resolution was mainly adopted to benefit Iceland and a few other
States which were dependent on their fisheries. The preferential rights of Ice-
land were recently discussed by the International Court of Justice when the
court delivered its opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom
v. Iceland) (Merits), [1974] I.C.J. 4. See Briney, The Icelandic Fisheries Dispute:
A Decision is Finally Rendered, 5 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 248 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Shrimps, May 9, 1972, United States-
Brazil, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES, OCEANOGRAPH-
IC RESOURCES, AND WILDLIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PARTY 627-42
(Comm. Print 1974). Also see other United States bilateral agreements on
fisheries with Canada, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, Germany, India, Japan, the
Soviet Union, and others. For bilateral fishery agreements of other States, see
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 573-86
(U.N. Legislative Series 1976), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18.
rights '3 6 States because the 200-mile fishing zone covers all historic
waters. The 1958 Geneva Conference discussed the historic rights
through a resolution which agreed that in case of conflict between
preferential rights and historic rights, the former should prevail.3 7
The only reference to historic rights in the ICNT can be found in the
latter part of paragraph 3 of Article 62,38 which requires the coastal
State to consider "the need to minimize economic dislocation in
States whose nationals havehabitually fished in the zone. . .. 39 Of
course, such vague references are open to varying interpretations.
One can predict that with regard to future State behavior, lack of
agreement in the law of the sea conference may create more situa-
tions such as the "Cod war"4 and the "Tuna war,"41 which in turn
can lead to some form of economic retaliation 2 or to political or legal
conflict. Such conflict may arise in the future, despite past history of
ocean use showing only a few violent incidents concerning fisheries.
Furthermore, the bilateral agreements which have usually followed
such incidents are indicative of fishing nations' efforts in finding
amicable solutions to their fishery problems.
36. On historic fishing rights, see F. GARCIA AmADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND
CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURcES OF THE SEA 206, 207, 209 (2d ed. 1963); D.
JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES-A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-
ORIENTED INQUIRIES 243, 287 (1965).
37. UNCLOS II, OFFICIAL RECORDS, Committee of the Whole (2d mtg.) 41,
para. 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 19/8 (1960).
38. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 62(3).
39. Id.
40. Iceland's adoption of a 12-mile fishery zone in the late 1950's caused
several clashes between the Icelandic protection vessels and those of the British
Royal Navy. These incidents are usually known as the "Cod war." The Icelandic
fishery disputes with the United Kingdom finally came before the International
Court of Justice in 1972. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v.
Iceland) (Merits), [1974] I.C.J. 4; id. (Order), [1972] I.C.J. 4. See also M. DAvIS,
ICELAND EXTENDS ITS FISHERIES LIMITS: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1963); Bilder,
The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 37; Goldsworthy,
Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 258 (1974); Goy, The Icelandic Fisheries Question, 87 J. DU DROIT INT'L
370 (1960); Green, The Territorial Sea and the Anglo-Icelandic Dispute, 9 J.
PuB. L. 53 (1960); Katz, Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case, 22 INT'L
& CoMp. L.Q. 83 (1973); Khan, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases-A Critique, 15
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Tiewul, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1973) and
the Ghost of Rebus Sic Stantibus, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Pol. 455 (1973);
Comment, The Making of a Case for the International Court of Justice: Ice-
landic Fishing Rights, 6 ComP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 394 (1973); Recent Deci-
sions, International Court of Justice-Procedure-Temporary Relief in the
Form of Interim Measures Granted on Prima Facie Evidence of Jurisdiction
and Jurisdiction of the Merits Found on Basis of Prior Agreement to Compul-
sory I.C.J. Jurisdiction, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 512 (1974).
41. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
42. Withholding foreign assistance, for example, can be an economic retalia-
tion by a developed State against a developing State. By contrast, the latter may
put an embargo on raw materials against the former. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1975
(Supp. V 1975).
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National Legislation on the 200-Mile Fishing Zone
The existing national legislation on 200-mile fishing zones also
presents a prediction of future behavior in the absence of a law of the
sea treaty. Although detailed discussion on existing national fishery
laws is not within the scope of this Article, it is appropriate to
present a brief review of controversial laws of some Latin American
States. Between 25 January and 1 February 1975, seven United
States fishing vessels were seized by the Government of Ecuador
within Ecuador's 200-mile maritime zone. The fines and the cost of
purchase of the confiscated catch amounted to a $3,000,000 loss for
United States fishermen.43 Of course, based on the Fishermen's Pro-
tective Act of 1967 and through a special fund administered by the
Departments of State and Commerce, the United States fishermen
are always repaid for such loss. 44 It is interesting to note that al-
though Ecuador has constitutionally established a 200-mile territo-
rial sea,45 it does not prohibit foreign fishing operation within this
zone so long as the foreign fishing vessels carry "a registration cer-
tificate, a fishing permit and other relevant documents. '46 Five of the
aforementioned seized American vessels did not have licenses; the
other two were in excess of 600 net registered tons and therefore
violated Ecuadorian law.47 According to the Peruvian General Fish-
ing Law of 1971,48 foreign fishing vessels can operate in the Peruvian
"jurisdictional sea" so long as they pay $500 for a certificate of
registry and "$20 for a fishing permit, per net register ton."49 Similar
provisions can be found in the Brazilian law of 1971.50
43. See Fish and Wildlife Briefings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1975).
44. Id. at 159-61. See also 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1979 (1975).
45. See Article 6 of the Political Constitution of the Ecuadorian State, Regis-
tro Oficial No. 133 of 25 May 1967, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
TREATIES RELATING TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA 79 (U.N. Legislative Series 1970),
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15; Fishery Laws of Ecuador, Registro Oficial No. 299
of 2 June 1961, reprinted in id.- at 631; Registro Oficial No. 353 of 31 October
1961, reprinted in id. at 79 (Supp.); Registro Oficial No. 273 of 19 June 1964,
reprinted in id. at 632.
46. Article 6 of the Political Constitution of the Ecuadorian State, Registro
Oficial No. 133 of 25 May 1967, reprinted in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
TREATIES RELATING TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA 79 (U.N. Legislative Series 1970),
U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.B/15.
47. Fish and Wildlife Briefings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1975).
48. See, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA 315-18 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16.
49. General Fishing Law of 1971, art. 35, reprinted in id. at 317.
50. Decree No. 68,459 of April 1, 1971 on Fishing Zones, art. 7, reprinted in id.
In short, the Latin American States have not excluded foreign
fishing operations from their 200-mile maritime zones, but they have
placed restrictions, increased registration or license fees, and im-
posed severe penalties for the violation of fishing laws. For example,
violation of the fishing laws of Argentina entails a fine of $5,000 to
$100,000;51 that of Mexican laws varies from 25,000 to 100,000
pesos. 52
It is not easy to predict whether other coastal States will follow
Latin American policy of excessive license fees and penalties. But in
the case of penalties, the broad language of Article 73 of the ICNT,5 3
which recognizes the right of the coastal State to impose penalties for
violation of its fishery laws,5 4 may indeed lead to such practices.
These Latin American fishery laws, although historically controv-
ersial, are presently compatible with the fishery provisions of the
ICNT. Such compatibility is not surprising, as the idea of a 200-mile
exclusive fishing zone began in Latin America. Furthermore, the
fishery parts of the ICNT are a combination of various fishery propo-
sals submitted to UNCLOS. On the one hand, these proposals reflect
the national interests and national legislation of the States involved.
On the other hand, recent national legislation on exclusive fishing
zones indicate that most coastal States have followed the general
framework recommended by the SNT or its substitutes. Although
such a cycle cannot guarantee any uniformity in future national




On the universal level, fishery regulations are presently based on
the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources on the High Seas, which came into force on March
at 272. Under a special agreement between Brazil and the United States in force
since 1972, the United States pays a flat fee to Brazil annually. In exchange, the
United States is able to issue licenses to United States fishermen and regulate
their operations under United States laws. See Fish and Wildlife Briefings:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1975).
51. See Act No. 17,500 of 25 October 1967 concerning the Promotion of
Fisheries, as amended by Act No. 20,136 of 5 February 1973, art. 12(b), reprinted
in NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SFbA 271(U.N. Legislative Series 1976), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18.
52. Act of 29 December 1971 on Taxes and on Fees for Fisheries, art. 18 (II),
reprinted in id. at 336.
53. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 73.
54. Id.
504
(VOL. 15: 493, 1978] Significant Fishery Management Issues
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
20, 1966.55 While declaring the rights of States to engage in fishing on
the high seas, the Convention imposes a duty upon all States to adopt
necessary conservation measures, either individually or in coopera-
tion with one another.56 The conservation referred to in the Conven-
tion was based on maximum sustainable yield to achieve maximum
supply of food for human consumption and other maritime prod-
ucts.5 The pressure behind the Convention was twofold. First, some
nations believed that by empowering the coastal States to pass legis-
lation on high seas fisheries, the claims to a wider territorial sea
(beyond three miles) would be reduced. Second, nations which had
made some agreements concerning the high seas fisheries were trying
to receive Convention support. 8 In short, the Convention tried to get
all the interested States to participate in a conservation program and
made such a program an international obligation for all participants.
However, a number of weaknesses prevented the Convention from
achieving its conservation goals. Unilateral conservation measures
undertaken by the coastal State, especially when such State was
hundreds of miles away from the fishing areas on the high seas, were
not effective enough to attain the conservation objectives. Further-
more, formulation of conservation measures was based only on
stocks of fish rather than region or other criteria. Finally, there was a
lack of concern over the allocation of resources and enforcement of
the conservation program.
5 9
Despite these weaknesses, the 1958 Geneva Fishing Convention
became "a moral code" 60 for member fishing nations as well as non-
55. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 131L. 54 (1958). For details on the Convention, see
F. GARCIA AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF
THE SEA 187-94 (2d ed. 1963); Harrington, The Future of the Geneva Convention
on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, in THE
FUTURE OF THE SEA'S RESOURCES 62, 62-65 (L. Alexander ed. 1968); Bishop, The
1958 Geneva Conference on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the Seas, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 1206,1213 (1962); Crutchfield, The Convention on
Fishing and Living Resources of the High Seas, 1 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 114,
114-24 (1968).
56. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L. 54, art. 1 (1958).
57. Id., art. 2.
58. F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 172
(1965).
59. See Bishop, The 1958 Geneva Conference on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the Sea, 62 COLUm. L. REV. 1213, 1224 (1958) (statement
of Max Sorensen, Head of the Danish Delegation to the Geneva Conference).
60. A. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF MARINE FISHERIES 118 (1973).
members. 61 Now, the question is why such a moral code failed to
establish a unique fishery conservation policy. The answer is simple.
Drafters of the Fishing Convention, like other negotiators in the 1958
Geneva Conference, were still following Hugo Grotius' doctrine on
Mare Liberum.62 Therefore, unlike the participants in the present
Law of the Sea Conference who are worried about the allocation and
management of ocean resources, the participants in the 1958 Geneva
Conference were seeking a free sea up to the three-mile territorial sea
of the coastal State. This goal explains why the 200-mile fishing zone
was a forbidden subject in 1958.
Regional Approach
The problem of conservation was realized by the fishing nations
long before the Geneva Conference. Solutions were usually sought
through bilateral and multilateral treaties. These conservation
treaties were basically concerned with maximum sustainable yield,
research, or regulation. A good example of this group is the Bering
Sea fur seal controversy between Britain and the United States,
which resulted in the Bering Sea Fur Seal Arbitration of 1892,63 and
the multilateral Convention of 1911,64 with Russia and Japan as two/
additional parties. This latter agreement resulted m a series of regu-
lations and agreements concerning the North Pacific fur seal
fisheries.65
Another regional conservation measure based on the abstention
doctrine emerged in 1923. This conservation method, which was
introduced by Canada and the United States, while maximizing the
yield of halibut in the North Pacific, was later incorporated into the
International North Pacific Fishery Convention of 1952, where Japan
agreed to abstain from taking salmon in the designated area.66
61. For example, the two great fishing nations, Japan and the Soviet Union,
were among those States that did not ratify the Convention; nevertheless, they
followed its guidelines in their bilateral or multilateral agreements on fisheries.
62. H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (1608).
63. See 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 770 (1898).
64. L. LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FISHERIES 55-95 (1944). See
also Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seal, Feb.,
1957, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, 93d CONG., 2d SESS.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES, OCEANOGRAPH-
ic RESOURCES, AND WILDLIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PARTY 374-86
(Comm. Print 1974).
65. Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seal, Feb.,
1957, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES, OCEANOGRAPH-
IC RESOURCES, AND WILDLIFE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PARTY 374-86
(Comm. Print 1974).
66. See F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 173,
188 (1965). Abstention as a "general principle" was rejected in the 1958 Geneva
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Other conservation measures adopted by recent regional agree-
ments include the quota system, closed sea, closed season, and re-
strictions on gears.6
7
Law of the Sea Conference and Conservation
Despite its recognition of coastal States' sovereign rights in the
exclusive economic zone, the ICNT imposes certain duties upon the
coastal State to adopt conservation measures, 68 to maintain max-
imum sustainable yield through full utilization and elimination of
over-exploitation, 9 to determine the "allowable catch", and to give
other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch if the coastal
State itself does not have the capacity to harvest such catch in its
entirety.7
0
Unlike the 1958 Geneva Fishing Convention, which was only
concerned with the biological aspects of fisheries for conservation
purposes,71 the ICNT requires the coastal State to adopt a conserva-
tion program which considers biological, economic, technical, social
and environmental factors of fisheries.7 2 For example, Article 61
Conference. The Soviet delegate argued that the principle has no economic
foundation and furthermore was discriminating against newcomers, i.e., the
newly independent States. See 5 UNCLOS, 3d Comm. (6th mtg.) 8, para. II, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/41; id. 3d Comm. (36th mtg.) 104-05, paras. 10-17. See also
International Law Comm'n (8th sess.), paras. 61, 63, 65, 78-80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.
4/99/Add. 1 (1956); Oda, Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (1959), 3 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 65, 79-82 (1959).
67. See, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA (U.N. Legislative Series 1976), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18; id. (U.N. Legis-
lative Series 1974), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16; id. (U.N. Legislative Series
1970), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15. See also Fish and Wildlife Briefings: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1975). On the United States-Japanese agreement concerning
salmon and the king and tanner crab, see NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES
RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 795-802, 803-07 (U.N. Legislative Series 1974),
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16. On the problems arising out of the quota system,
see Fish and Wildlife Briefings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-60 (1975); Recent Devel-
opments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 665, 668-72
(1975).
68. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 61.
69. Id.
70. Id., arts. 61(1), 62(2).
71. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, art. 2, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 13/L. 54 (1958). Article 2 only refers to
"optimum sustainable yield" as a conseryation method.
72. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 61. For details on the constitutive elements of
fisheries, such as biological, economic, technical and political, see Mirvahabi,
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indicates that in order to achieve maximum sustainable yield, the
coastal.State's conservation program should consider "relevant en-
vironmental and economic factors. . . , fishing patterns, (and] the
interdependence of stocks . . .,,3
A review of the conservation formula of the ICNT indicates that
the negotiator$ in UNCLOS have tried to introduce certain
guidelines which form a basis for each coastal State's adoption of its
own conservation measures. The formula has also advocated all con-
stitutive elements of fishery to avoid the fishery conservation prob-
lems of the past. The success of the ICNT formula, however, depends
upon the coastal States' reactions.
Treaty Approach
Upon world-wide ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty (based
on the ICNT), one may make a number of predictions. The first
assumption would be the enactment of new conservation laws by all
coastal States following the treaty recommendations. Because the
treaty only provides certain frameworks, not specific standards, the
outcome, of course, would be more than fifty different conservation
policies. Had the treaty offered useful conservation standards, the
value of these international standards, whose acceptance or rejection
depended on the coastal States' discretion, would still have been
questionable. In other words, such a standard may be interpreted as
no standard at all.
A second possibility relates to non-compliance by a developing
coastal State. A sophisticated conservation program needs an ade-
quate budget and sufficient scientific data, both of which probably
cannot be provided by most developing coastal States whose
fisheries are based on small-scale operations. Lack of sufficient data
and statistics may also cause problems for a developing coastal State,
even in adopting its allowable catch formula.
Dispute over allowable catch is closer to reality than prediction.
The allowable catch may dissatisfy distant water fishing nations
which may then try to find new areas for their operations. New areas
can be 200-mile fishing zones of other States or the high seas. With
respect to the former, the traditional conflict between the coastal
State and the distant water fishing State will continue despite the
new location. As regards the high seas, through its efforts a distant
water fishing nation may even develop the unattractive or forgotten
species of the high seas. By contrast, a large number of distant water
SNT: Conservation and Management ofFisheries in the Exclusive Economic
Zone, Sec. I1., 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. (1978) (in press).
73. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 61(3).
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fishing nations may operate on the high seas and overexploit the
resources. An encouraging allowable-catch formula, on the other
hand, may lead to congestion and overexploitation of fishery re-
sources within the 200-mile exclusive economic zones.
Another classification of the allowable-catch problem should dis-
tinguish between the policy of the developed State and that of the
developing State. Should a technologically advanced coastal State
decide to fence out the distant water fishing nations within its exclu-
sive economic zone, it can do so by exploiting the entire allowable
catch itself. In such cases, the only solution available to distant water
fishing nations lies within the dispute-settlement mechanism.74
The allowable-catch formula, in the case of a developing coastal
State with a weak conservation policy or none at all, may create more
complications. Pressured by its treaty obligation, a developing
coastal State may permit foreign fishermen to harvest the allowable
catch so long as the license fee or other fees are paid. The fees may be
extremely high in the case of abundant fishing zones, or low in the
case of a fishing area with less attractive fish species. In both in-
stances, the outcome would be congestion of fishing vessels in the
area and application of the conservation measures of the flag States.
This method of fishing operations will be disastrous as far as conser-
vation is concerned. However, if the developing coastal State prefers
the continuation of small-scale fishing operations by its nationals
and the collection of license fees from foreign fishermen, it is free to
do so, for there is no international authority 5 to question the conser-
vation regimes of the coastal States.
An ambitious developing State which intends to develop its fishing
industry, on the other hand, may enter into service, management or
marketing contracts, or any other form of joint venture with foreign
companies. This possibility may be a stimulus not only for the fish-
ing industry but also for other industries of the coastal State. Joint
ventures can also result in cooperation between foreign and local
scientists, exchange of data and statistics, training of the local staff,
and possibly the transfer of fishing technology. This approach may
be the best method of utilization and conservation of fisheries for
developing coastal States.
74. On dispute settlement provisions of the ICNT, see ICNT, supra note 4, pt.
XV.
75. For a discussion on the possibility of a global fishery organization, see
text accompanying notes 110-26 infra.
Non-Treaty Approach
A successful law of the sea treaty will not improve fishery conser-
vation regimes immediately. In the absence of a treaty, the fishery
provisions of the ICNT may still inspire the decisionmakers.
An interesting issue which should be raised here is whether the
failure of the Law of the Sea Conference will revive the 1958 Geneva
Fishing Convention. In the absence of a treaty, as noted before, all
coastal States will most likely adopt the 200-mile exclusive economic
zones; and because the zone is not regarded as high seas for fishing
purposes, the Geneva Convention will make a very small contribu-
tion.76 The present State practice on conservation, however, will most
likely continue. This may lead to conservation regimes contrary to
international standards, or no conservation program for some coastal
States. The present unbalanced allocation system of fishery resources
will probably continue if the coastal States decide to prevent foreign
fishing in their economic zones and utilize the resources themselves.
This, in turn, can bring legal battles before international tribunals.
For example, in the absence of the treaty, and prior to the establish-
ment of the 200-mile zone as a customary international law, distant
water fishing States can consider the zone as part of the high seas
and exploit the fishery resources. Does this mean more "cod wars"
and "tuna wars"? The possibility of such conflict is not remote.
Nevertheless, it is more probable that the fishing nations will resolve
their fishery problems through bilateral and regional agreements.
REGIONAL FISHERY PROBLEMS
Existing Problems in Certain Regions
Regional fishery problems 7 relate not only to fish species but also
to the number of fishing nations operating in the region, their fishing
methods, and other considerations. The following may illustrate
some of these regional problems.
76. For the role of the Geneva Fishing Convention, see notes 55-62 and ac-
companying text supra.
77. For details on regional fishery organizations and their problems, see
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF FISHERY ARRANGEMENTS (working papers pub-
lished for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1972-1974). These papers include the
works of Christy, Alternative Arrangements for Marine Fisheries: An Over-
view; Crutchfield & Lawson, Alternatives forManagement of the West African
Fisheries; Kasahara & Burke, North Pacific Fisheries Management; Miles,
Alternative Organizational Arrangements to Facilitate Global Arrangements
of Fisheries; Saila & Norton, Tuna: A Summary of Current Status, Expected
Trends, and Alternative Management Arrangements; Tussing & Hiebert,
Fisheries of the Indian Ocean. See also Christy, Disparate Fisheries: Problems
for the Law of the Sea Conference and Beyond, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 337
(1974); Christy, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Arrangements: A Test of the
Species Approach, 1 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 65 (1973).
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The North Pacific
There are only a few fish species in the North Pacific, but each has
a large population and a long history of use.78 The first conservation
treaty for the fur seal was formulated in this region.79 The abstention
doctrine also emerged in this area.8 For many years only four
States-the Soviet Union, Japan, Canada, and the United States-
were operating in the North Pacific; in recent years, however, the
new entrants have created problems in reaching agreement. Another
problem in the region concerns certain fish species which have re-
mained completely unregulated.8 '
The East Central Atlantic
Unlike the North Pacific area, the East Central Atlantic region has
a large number of fish species, but only a few of them have large
populations. The number of fishing nations amounts to forty, half of
which are distant water fishing States with highly advanced fishing
technology. Two regional bodies, the Committee for the East Central
Atlantic Fisheries (1969) and the International Commission for the
Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (1971), have been established for re-
gional management. Due to conflicting interests and the large mem-
bership, these bodies have not been successful in formulating a
meaningful conservation regime for the region. 2
The Indian Ocean
With the exception of tuna, most fishery resources of the Indian
Ocean are either underexploited or have not reached the maximum-
sustainable-yield level. In spite of efforts by the Indian Ocean
Fisheries Commission and scientific data published and distributed
by the Soviet Union, lack of information is still one of the problems
that impede improvements of the fishery resources in the Indian
Ocean.8
3
78. Christy, Disparate Fisheries: Problems for the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence and Beyond, 1 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 337, 340 (1974).
79. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
81. Christy, Disparate Fisheries: Problems for the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence and Beyond, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 337,341 (1974). See also Kasahata &
Burke, North Pacific Fisheries Management, in INTERNATIONAL STuDIES OF
FISHERY ARRANGEMENTS (working papers published for Resources for the Fu-
ture, Inc., 1972-1974).
82. Christy, Disparate Fisheries: Problems for the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence and Beyond, 1 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 337, 342-43 (1974).
83. Id. at 344-46. See also Tussing & Hiebert, Fisheries of the Indian Ocean,
Law of the Sea Conference and Regional Fishery Problems
Unlike the 1958 Geneva Fishing Convention, which adopted a
universal approach towards fishery problems, the Informal Single
Composite Text favors regionalism. Throughout the fishery provi-
sions, the ICNT requires cooperation between coastal States and
subregional or regional fishery organizations. In Article 61, the ICNT
adds "global organization" to these organizations. Article 61 encour-
ages the coastal States to adopt a conservation program in accord-
ance with recommended subregional, regional, or global minimum
standards.84 It further adds that proper conservation measures
should be sought through cooperation of the coastal State and re-
gional, subregional and global organizations.8" The coastal State's
cooperation with "regional" 86 or "appropriate international organi-
zations"87 is also required for conservation of anadromous, highly
migratory fish species and marine mammals.
Recognition of regional or international fishery organizations re-
ferred to by the ICNT is easy,88 but the vague language of the ICNT
concerning global organizations is questionable. The 1958 Fishing
Convention explicitly involved the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tions (FAO) as part of fishery conservation schemes. 89 The ICNT's
silence on the FAO should not be interpreted as exclusion of this
agency, for the FAO's Committee on Fisheries is the most experi-
enced existing global fishery organization. By their general reference
to "global organizations," the drafters of the ICNT could have meant
the inclusion of the FAO and other United Nations agencies 0 which
have in the past been involved in some fishery programs. 91
Treaty Approach
The ICNT has stressed the significant role of the regional fishery
organizations in resolving the regional fishery problems, but the past
in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF FISHERY ARRANGEMENTS (working papers pub-
lished for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1972-1974).
84. ICNT, supra note 4, art. 61(3).
85. Id., art. 61(2).
86. See id., art. 66(5) (cooperation for conservation and management of anad-
romous fish species).
87. See id., art. 64 (cooperation for conservation of highly migratory species);
id., art. 65 (cooperation for protection of marine mammals).
88. For a list of names, functions and structures of regional fishery organiza-
tions, see A. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES 77-277
(1973).
89. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L. 54, art. 5 (1958).
90. The list includes, inter alia, United Nations Development Program, Inter-
governmental Oceanic Commission (UNESCO), Intersecretarial Committee on
Scientific Programs Relating to Oceanography and Aquatic Science and
Fisheries Information System. On inclusion of FAO, see note 110 infra.
91. See text accompanying notes 110 & 119 infra.
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failure of existing organizations 2 proves the contrary. With the ex-
ception of one or two,93 these organizations have thus far not been
able to contribute to the management of world fisheries. Lack of
enforcement power, inadequate budgets, and the absence of capacity
for scientific research are the major reasons.
Adoption of the 200-mile fishing zones will cover a large area of
the ocean that is presently under the jurisdiction of regional fishery
organizations. This extension may even diminish the importance of
the relevant organizations. However, a wider fishing zone does not
end the regional fishery problems; it may only shift a set of problems
from one region to another or transfer jurisdiction from a regional
body to a coastal State. For example, the distant water fishing States
which in the past had to follow regional standards set by fishery
organizations would now have to deal with the standards of the
coastal States.
Thus, if the existing regional fishery bodies continue their present
practice, the existence or absence of a law of the sea treaty would not
make any difference in future management of fisheries. There is a
need for restructuring the fishery organizations. The ICNT does not
describe the functions, responsibilities or powers these organizations
may assume. Nevertheless, the idea of involving fishery organiza-
tions in future decisionmaking processes may encourage the fishing
nations to reorganize them.
Non-Treaty Approach
In the absence of a law of the sea treaty, State practice concerning
regional fishery problems will prevail. Present practice seeks solu-
tions through bilateral or multilateral agreements.
92. Some of the well-known fishery organizations are the International
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (1949), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES, OCEANOGRAPHIC RESOURCES, AND WILDLIFE TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PARTY (Comm. Print 1974); International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission (1952), reprinted in id. at 231; The Indo-Pacific
Fisheries Council (1961), reprinted in id. at 244; International Whaling Commis-
ion (1946), reprinted in id. at 345; The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion (1951), reprinted in id. at 223; International Commission for the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic Tunas (1966), reprinted in id. at 214. Discussion on structures
and functions of these fishery organizations is beyond the scope of this study;
however, the outstanding work of A. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF
MARINE FISHERIES (1973), is highly recommended. See also authorities cited note
77 supra.
93. The International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF),
The unilateral extension of fishing zones to 200 miles will definite-
ly have some impact on the function of the regional fishery bodies.
Thus, elimination or reorganization of some of these regional bodies
is foreseeable. One may also anticipate the creation of new fishery
organizations if the coastal States follow the ICNT suggestions.
It should be noted here that the establishment of new fishery
bodies cannot lead to a unique system of conservation and manage-
ment of fisheries so long as the activities of these organizations are
not coordinated. Uncoordinated fishery efforts have, both in the past
and at present, created different conservation standards for the same
fish species in different regions.
Another criticism relates to the fact that some of these fishery
organizations are species-oriented 4 and may therefore preserve one
fish species at the expense of the others.95
Lack of a law of the sea treaty may also encourage the fishing
States to grant control and management of fisheries to non-fishery
regional organizations.96 The first category includes the United Na-
tions groups, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and
the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The second category would
encompass the European Economic Community (EEC). The first
group is too politically oriented. Furthermore, the slow decision-
making process in these organizations is incompatible with the dy-
namic nature of the fishery problems. 97 The EEC, on the other hand,
may be a better choice. 98
CONCLUSION
Law of the Sea Conference: A Final Appraisal
So far, this Article has discussed the existing fishery problems and
hypothesized the consequences of non-agreement in the Law of the
for example, has been considered a successful regional fishery organization.
For some of the activities of ICNAF, see Christy, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Arrangement: A Test of the Species Approach, 1 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 65, 67-
77 (1973).
94. See A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 169 (2d ed., Occasional Paper No. 5, 1976).
95. The problem relates to the so-called "food web," or marine life cycle, in
which larger fish consume smaller fish, and so on. For details on this biological
aspect of fisheries, see F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FisHERIEs 65-67 (1965). A good example is the problem of the preservation of
whales and krill in Antarctica, for the latter is the food of the former. See A.
PARDO & E. BORGESE, supra note 94.
96. See note 72 supra and text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
97. Id.
98. Id. On EEC and the law of the sea, see TRILATERAL TAsK FORCE ON THE
OCEANs, A NEW REGIME FOR THE OCEANs (Triangle Paper No. 9, 1975); Vignes,
The E.E.C. and the Law of the Sea, in m NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA
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Sea Conference with respect to fisheries. Nonetheless, because
fishery is a part of the so-called "package deal," and so long as
UNCLOS insists on covering the realm of the law of the sea only in
one universal treaty, it is appropriate to evaluate the Conference as a
whole and to predict its progress or failure in the future.
Contrary to the popular belief that UNCLOS has failed, the out-
come of each session of the Conference indicates that there are more
agreements than disagreements among the negotiators. Consensus
has already been achieved in Committee II on most traditional law of
the sea issues. Therefore, it is not improbable that the Conference
will eventually have to replace the "package deal" doctrine with that
of separate treaties. Had the Conference followed the 1958 Geneva
Conference system, a fisheries treaty would probably have been the
first outcome.
The Conference may also come up with an ambiguous treaty and
let future interpretation or dispute-settlement mechanisms fill the
lacuna. That being the case, those who prefer the existence of any law
of the sea code over "non-agreement" may have to face disputes and
legal battles, followed by an imperfect treaty. Further, such a treaty
will not be acceptable to those who have already objected to any
immature treaty and are expecting a viable one.
The Role of the Group of 77
Despite their political and economic power, the developed States
cannot succeed in formulating a "developed-State" treaty because of
the voting power of the Group of 77.91 Conversely, the latter can lead
the Conference to adopt a "Group of 77" treaty. Prediction of the
consequences of such a treaty will be made later,100 but at this stage
of negotiations it is obvious that the Group of 77 does not have any
intention of agitating the pre-existing conflicts between the devel-
oped and the developing States. Furthermore, the solidarity of the
Group may be weakened if some members decide to support the
developed States' proposals in order to secure their foreign assist-
335, 337 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds & J. Welch eds. 1973); Hardy, Regional
Approaches to Law of the Sea Problems: The European Community, 24 INT'L &
Com. L.Q. 336 (1975). For the recent decision of the EEC in extending the
fishery zone to 200 miles, see Tm ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1976, at 49-50; id., Dec. 4,
1976, at 64; id., Nov. 6, 1976, at 67-68..
99. The Group of 77, with more than 100 members, includes developing States
from Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. 18 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY
ARCHvEs 25377 (1972).
100. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
ance in financial, technical or political support. After certain
compromises and trade-offs, the Law of the Sea Conference may still
come up with a Group of 77 Treaty. But this means that the Group
must have definitely procured the tolerance of the developed States
in advance.
The conference may formulate a treaty which only lays down cer-
tain general rules concerning each subject and leaves the details to
future negotiations among States or national legislation. The idea of
general frameworks on deep seabed mining issues has already been
rejected by the Group of 77, which tries not only to create a broad
control for the Seabed Authority but also to enumerate various ac-
tivities on seabed mining which can be controlled by the
Authority.' 0
1
The Group of 77's support of a powerful seabed authority reflects
the former's distrust of the developed States and its interest as the
real beneficiary of the law of the sea treaty. It is a well-known fact
that the developed States with deep seabed mining technology are
better off without a law of the sea treaty, and their seabed mining
companies will be happier without an international seabed
authority. 0 2
In their decision-making process, the representatives of the devel-
oped States in the Conference have to consider not only the political
goals of their governments but also the practical aspect and economic
return of any proposal for their commercial enterprises. Private
companies in the United States, for example, are constantly trying to
change Federal regulations; in some instances, they even hope for
deregulation. 03 Obviously, with such an attitude, United States
companies do not wish to be regulated by a powerful international
authority sitting, for example, in Jamaica. 10 4 Further, supervision by
an international regulatory seabed authority which does not even
possess the relevant technology can be frustrating. The interest
groups and lobbyists at home create an added concern for United
States representatives, as the creation of an international organiza-
tion is always an additional burden to the United States taxpayers.
The interest groups can also pressure Congress for approval of the
pending legislation on deep seabed mining. 05
101. On deliberation of Committee I, which deals with the issue of deep
seabed mining and also for the role of Group of 77 in that Committee, see
authorities cited note 17 supra.
102. See Aguilar, How Will the Future Deep Seabed Regime be Organized?,
in LAW or THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGMIE OF THE OcEANs 43 (J. Gamble & G.
Pontecorvo eds. 1974); Barkenbus, Seabed Negotiations: The Failure of United
States Policy, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623 (1977).
103. Domestic oil industry is a good example.
104. Jamaica has been proposed as the seat of the Authority.
105. Enactment of Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16
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The Group of 77, on the other hand, distrusts foreign companies
and favors a powerful seabed authority which can support its rights
in the future. The Group is not troubled by inefficiency, the slow
machinery of international organizations or the lengthy waiting
periods expected for the first economic gain.
The distrust shown by the developing States towards foreign
companies or their governments is rooted in the era of colonialism.
Although it is no longer fashionable to talk about colonialism, the
policy of the Group of 77 in the Law of the Sea Conference indicates
that the bitter memory of political or economic colonialism is still
alive. On the other hand, with its voting power, the Third World has
created a system of international colonialism directed towards the
developed States. This system, which has monopolized decision-
making processes in recent international negotiations, can also affect
the outcome of UNCLOS.
Non-Agreement
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea may
continue or terminate in the future without producing any treaty.
The outcome in either case may create a set of similar problems. As
an international forum, a pending conference may play a significant
role in the process of establishing customary international law. A
similar possibility may exist even after the termination of an unsuc-
cessful conference. The ICNT and the deliberations of UNCLOS may
establish customary international law, as the outcome of the 1930
Hague Conference on Codification of the Law of the Sea'0 6 and the
1960 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea'0 7 have both done.
The fact that the law of the sea developed through customary
international law during the past few centuries may raise another
issue as to whether customary law should be preferred over a written
agreement. Advantages and disadvantages in customary internation-
al law as well as those of international legislations have been dis-
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976), was due to pressure by the United States coastal
fishermen, especially those from New England.
106. See Hudson, The First Conference forthe Codification of International
Law, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 447 (1930); Reeves, The Codification of the Law of
Territorial Waters, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 486 (1930).
107. See generally Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1960); Franklin,
The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments, 33 S. CAL. L. REV. 357 (1960);
Jessup, The Law of the Sea Around Us, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1961).
cussed in detail elsewhere. 08 The relevant issues here should be
whether the contemporary problems relating to law of the sea can be
resolved through the customary-law process. The magic word is
technology. With revolutionary changes in technology, even a mod-
ern written agreement might become outdated within a very short
time, not to mention customary rules. Of course, the stability and
functional advantages of customary rules cannot be ignored; there-
fore, one may foresee the application of these rules to certain future
problems of the law of the sea. But the applicability of customary
international law in the case of fisheries or deep seabed mining, for
example, is most unlikely because of the time and technology ele-
ments involved.
In the absence of the Law of the Sea Conference and the treaty,
States may resolve the law of the sea problems through their unila-
teral actions or bilateral or multilateral agreements. Whereas unila-
teral actions do not affect the status of fisheries drastically, they
seem unthinkable in the case of deep seabed mining at the present
time. For example, even initial action by a developed State for the
exploitation of the deep seabed resources may incite a hostile reac-
tion by the Group of 77 and lead to legal suits before national or
international tribunals. Warned by the risk of unilateral action, the
developed States may, as a group, conclude their own treaty. Can the
Group of 77 bring class-action suits against individual member
States or the newly established international organization? This is a
question of undeniable significance.
On the other hand, one may predict that because the Group of 77,
with more than 100 members, has a better chance of formulating a
viable treaty, it may do so without fearing the reactions of the devel-
oped States.
A Group of 77 treaty may raise the following questions: Would the
developed States have a strong case against a widely accepted treaty?
Would the foreign mining companies be willing to work for the
Group of 77 without their governments' political support? Would
they be able to work with a Group of 77 seabed authority? Would the
oil-exporting nations within the Group of 77 risk their capital?
The hypotheses or possibilities and consequences of non-agree-
ment can continue. Realistically, however, the interrelated problems
of food, population, economics, energy and environment are not indi-
vidual State concerns. Such commonality dictates that the world
community avoid violence and the use of force at sea.
108. See generally 6 G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 542, 547, 553 (1943);
E. LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 368 (1958); Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AMi. J.
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Whether the hypotheses discussed in the preceding pages become
realities has to be answered in the future. The only tenable theory at
this point relates to the fact that so long as the needs for raw
materials (for the developed States) and for foreign assistance (for
the developing States) exist, amicable law of the sea alternatives or
agreements, whether written or unwritten, can be predicted.
A Possible Solution for the Conservation of Fisheries
Through theoretical analysis, this Article has predicted some of the
fishery management problems of the future. Whether these hypothe-
ses become future reality is not the issue. Hypothesization on certain
unclear law of the sea issues may be a good exercise for a lawyer's
thinking. However, scientific findings which have produced account-
able readings in hundreds of books, articles, papers, and United
Nations documents indicate that, unlike deep seabed mining, most of
the fishery problems are known to mankind. Thus, what is not known
about the future of fisheries should not hinder the solution-finding
process for what is known concerning present problems. For exam-
ple, one can predict that technological changes might even create a
system of animal husbandry'0 9 for highly migratory fish species in
the future. Would this change the migratory nature of fish and make
them respect man-made boundaries at the present time?
As noted before, UNCLOS has not established a global fishery-
management regime. The ICNT has repeatedly referred to subregion-
al, regional or global organizations without any specific names." 0
Regional fishery organizations have already been discussed;"'
therefore, the emphasis here will be only on global organizations.
Since the beginning of the law-of-the-sea negotiations in the early
1970's, various proposals on global conservation of fisheries have
INT'L L. 662 (1953); McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International
Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955); Wright, Custom as a Basis for
International Law in the Post-war World, 2 TEx. INT'L L.F. 147 (1966). The
constitutive element of customary law was also discussed in the Fisheries Case
(United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 138-39, 191.
109. For a discussion on fencing the fish through electrical currents system as
well as other systems, see F. CRIusTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN
OcEAN FISHERIES 96, 97, 101, 102 (1965).
110. FAO has been mentioned in Article 2 of Annex VII of the ICNT as a
responsible fishery agency to provide lists of fishery experts for dispute settle-
ment purposes. ICNT, supra note 4, Annex VII. See also text accompanying
notes 84-91 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
been made by fishery experts. These proposals can be examined in
two categories.
First Category
This proposal" 2 seeks a global management regime in which a
coastal State, a group of States, or regional or global institutions
would assume management responsibilities in certain areas or on
certain fish species." 3
It further suggests that the "management entity" (whether a State
or regional or global organization) should have the exclusive right to
regulate the resources within its jurisdiction." 4 Other significant
principles introduced in this proposal include the establishment of a
global specialized agency whose main functions would be the collec-
tion of scientific information and the adoption of a dispute-settle-
ment mechanism," 5 enforcement by the "management entity,"" 6 and
a dispute-settlement formula." 7
This proposal has three weaknesses. First, its suggestions on man-
agement goals are too general to produce any functional use in the
future. Second, the proposal does not distinguish between the man-
agement problems of coastal States and those of the high seas. Third,
it confers equal regulatory and enforcement power upon States as
well as regional and global organizations.
Obviously, a global fishery organization cannot assume regulatory
or enforcement power in the exclusive economic zone. Such power is
even questionable with respect to the high seas.
In short, the proposal has tried to establish certain global stan-
dards. However, in the process, it has mixed the rights and duties of
the individual State with those of regional and global organizations.
A global fishery regime can be achieved only if the rights, duties,
functions and powers of the management entities are distinctively
appropriated. By assuming equal power for a coastal State and a
global fishery organization, the proposal will not only create confu-
sion, overlapping jurisdictions and duplicated management efforts,
but will also lead to a set of similar but not global standards.
112. The proposal is the outcome of the work of an expert group on the law of
the sea, sponsored by the American Society of International Law. See AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES FOR A GLOBAL FISHERIES MAN-
AGEMENT REGIME (report of the Working Group on Living Marine Resources
1974.)
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id. at 3, 11.
115. The dispute-settlement mechanism refers to violation of the global
criteria related to the function of the agency. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 18-20.
117. Id. at 13-16.
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Second Category
Inspired by the Portuguese paper on institutional requirements of
the SNT, n 8 and based on suggestions made in a meeting of a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in Lisbon in March of
1976,119 the second proposal suggests reorganization of FAO's
Committee on Fisheries as a global organization responsible for man-
agement of fisheries on a worldwide basis. 120 The proposal further
suggests universalization of COFI's membership12 ' and establish-
ment of the following within COFI: a Council for the representation
of regional fishery commissions; an Enterprise for the management
of fisheries in the international area; an independent Secretariat and
an able fishery-research system to be incorporated into the Inter-
governmental Oceanic Commission (IOC); dispute-settlement ma-
chinery; and an independent budget from a Trust fund, license fees
and activities of the Enterprise. 2 1
Having followed Ambassador Pardo's "common heritage of man-
kind" doctrine, the proposal is very much along the lines of the
Seabed Authority proposals. The creation of "Enterprise," "Sec-
retariat," "Council," and reference to "the international area"
rather than the high seas are examples of the similarity.
It is obvious that at this stage of the law of the sea negotiations,
participants in UNCLOS are not willing to create a strong regulatory
authority for the exploitation of high seas fisheries. Furthermore,
118. In the Fourth Session of UNCLOS, the Delegation of Portugal circulated
a paper indicating the references which were made throughout the SNT and the
RSNT to subregional, regional and global organizations. The Delegation further
asked the United Nations Secretariat to provide the Conference with an "an-
notated director" of the United Nations agencies which are involved with law of
the sea activities. See A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, supra note 94, at 20, 168.
119. See COFI/76/10, March 1976, paras. 60, 62, 66; document COFIC/4/7614;
document COFI/C/4/76/5.
120. The proposal is made in an occasional paper written by Dr. Arvid Pardo
and E. Mann Borgese. Dr. Pardo's "common heritage of mankind" doctrine was
first introduced to the Seabed Committee in 1967. See A. PARDO & E. BORGESE,
note 94 supra.
121. Id. at 175. COFI was established in 1965 within FAO's Fisheries Depart-
ment and has been open to all member nations which would notify the Director-
General of their intention to become members. As of 9 March 1976, COFI has 49
members, each having one vote. See DIRECTORY OF FAO STATUTORY AND
PANELS OF ExPERTS, as of March 1976, at 43; 2 FOOD AND AGRIcULTURE ORGANI-
ZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 125-26 (1976).
122. A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, supra note 94, at 171-75.
the revenue derived from these resources in a narrow high seas (after
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone) might not suffice for the
maintenance of a global fishery organization. For the same reason,
creation of an enterprise for direct exploitation of the resources is
meaningless.
Even assuming that the said problem would not arise, the distant
water fishing nations would prefer negotiations with coastal States
for the exploitation of resources in abundant areas of their economic
zones over dealing with an international fishery enterprise for lim-
ited high seas fisheries..
Another problem found within this proposal relates to the univer-
salization of COFI's membership. 123 Leading fishing nations with
larger contributions to a regulatory global organization will most
likely seek weighted-vote formulas.
Final Recommendations
Throughout this Article, suggestions have been made on functions
of the coastal States and the regional fishery organizations concern-
ing conservation and management of fisheries. As regards the global
fishery organization, the expertise and experience of COFI makes it
the most eligible organization for assuming global management re-
sponsibility. Of course, COFI has to be given more independence,
power, and an adequate budget in order to fulfill the management
goals. As far as the power of COFI is concerned, and considering the
eventuality of the exclusive economic zone, it seems more appropri-
ate for COFI to assume an advisory rather than a regulatory role.
Based on the foregoing, the new COFI should establish the fol-
lowing:
A Scientific Research Center. The idea is not to create a public
fishery library but to establish a worldwide monitoring and data
collection system. The Center can also be a financial source through
the selling of its services to those fishing nations which are in need of
scientific findings on their fisheries.
Annual Regional Meetings. The reports of regional fishery organi-
zations, United Nations or non-United Nations organizations (in-
volved with fisheries) and the scientific findings of the Center should
be circulated in these meetings. The meetings should conclude with
lists of recommendations for the management of fisheries.
Regional Training Centers. COFI should encourage the leading
fishing nations to establish training centers for assisting developing
123. See text accompanying note 121 supra. See also ICNT, supra note 4, pt.
XI (seabed), § 5.
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fishing nations. The costs may be shared by the host State and COFI.
The training courses may bring the fisheries scientists together to
improve understanding, may harmonize the fishing patterns, and
may finally lead to international cooperation among all regional
fishing nations.
Fisheries Disputes Subcommittees. Dispute settlement should be
left to provisions of the treaty on the law of the sea; but in the
absence of such treaty, the ICNT formulas 2 4 should be followed.
However, whenever needed, COFI can establish ad hoc subcommit-
tees to avoid disputes among its members.
A Regional Subcommittee. A regional subcommittee composed of
all regional fishery bodies should be established in order to eliminate
duplication of fishery efforts, overlapping jurisdictions, and so on.
The subcommittee should transfer the data received from regional
bodies to the scientific center of COFI.
The Antarctica Commission. The potentiality of Antarctica is
promising; therefore, under the auspices of the FAO, 125 or based on a
new constitutional provision, COFI should establish a permanent
Antarctica Commission for regulating the fisheries in the region. The
Commission can carry out its responsibilities with the cooperation of
the International Whaling Commission and the Antarctic Treaty
States.'26 In its supervisory capacity, COFI will be indirectly in-
volved in the regulatory scheme.
Based on the proposed formula, COFI can publish a Code of
Conduct for fishing nations every few years. Such a code may receive
more recognition and be more practical than any regulatory fisheries
laws.
124. See ICNT, supra note 4, pt. XV.
125. Under the auspices of FAO, in the past several regional fishery bodies
have been established in the Central Eastern Antarctic, the Southwest Atlan-
tic, the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean.
126. Krill and whales are the two most important fish species in Antarctica.
However, for the group of 13 States that are members to the Antarctica Treaty
of 1959, the region is important not only for fisheries but also for fresh water,
gas, oil and other minerals. The treaty members are very much opposed to the
idea of placing Antarctica under the Seabed Authority or having new entrants
in the area. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1977, at 93. For information on the Antarctic
Treaty, see 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (1960); The Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 5572 (1960); Hayton,
The Nations and Antarctica, 10 OESTERR. ZEITSCHRIFT FO-R OFFENTLICHES
RECHT 368 (1960); Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 117
(1947); Official Documents, Conference on Antarctica, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 476
(1960).
Although the above discussion was not intended to be predictive,
one cannot help wondering about the future of fisheries. It is foresee-
able, for example, for the Seabed Authority (if established) to assume
fishery-management responsibilities in the future. Based on its broad
power, the Authority can issue licenses for the high seas or for Antarc-
tica. It can also involve itself in the exploitation of the resources
directly. On the other hand, new scientific theories and the increas-
ing global needs for food and fishmeal in only a few decades might
assimilate the significance of fisheries to that of the seabed minerals
at the present time. What would follow, then, would be the creation
of a strong regulatory fisheries authority. The theory may sound
more realistic by making reference to the first Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. No one predicted a seabed authority in 1958.
